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Casenote
RES IPSA LOQUITUR: PLEADING ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE
Nuclear Corp. of America v. Lang, 338 F. Supp. 914 (D.
Neb. 1972).
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been a source of confusion
to the courts since its inception in the famous case of Byrne v.
Boadle,' where a barrel of flour rolled out of a warehouse window
and injured a passing pedestrian. From its birth to the present,
the doctrine has been riddled with various nuances concerning
both its application and effect.2 Despite a lack of uniformity among
the courts with respect to its use,3 there has been general agree-
ment that proper analysis of the doctrine presents two considera-
tions.4 First, whether the particular facts and circumstances nec-
essary to invoke res ipsa are present. Second, assuming the doc-
trine applies, what are its procedural consequences? While most
courts agree on the factual situations giving rise to the doctrine,
there has been considerable disagreement as to the doctrine's pro-
cedural effects. 5
Nuclear Corp. of America v. Lang6 raises an issue regarding
the procedural effects of res ipsa loquitur in diversity actions. To
what extent do the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supplant the
various procedural aspects given the doctrine by the forum state?
This note will examine the impact of Lang on the effect of pleading
specific acts of negligence in diversity actions.
1. 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
2. See W. PnossEn, HANDBOOK OF THm LAw OF TORTS §§ 39-40 (4th ed.
1971).
3. Id. § 40 at 228.
4. Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 1 U. CR1. L. REv. 519
(1934); James, Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases, 37 VA. L.
REv. 179 (1951); Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur,
20 IVIniN. L. Rav. 241 (1936); See also Comment, Res Ipsa Loquitur-
An Analysis of Its Application and Procedural Effects in Nebraska,
41 NEB. L. REv. 747 (1962).
5. For example, whether the doctrine acts as a presumption or an infer-
ence of negligence; whether the doctrine is available where the plain-
tiff introduces evidence of specific acts of negligence; whether the
doctrine is available where the plaintiff has pleaded specific acts of
negligence; and the effect of defendant's evidence in rebuttal. For a
discussion of the various positions taken by the courts on these issues,
see note 4 supra and the authorities cited therein.
6. 337 F. Supp. 914 (D. Neb. 1972).
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The action in Lang was brought for property damage resulting
from a collision between plaintiff's truck, driven by one of its em-
ployees, and the defendant farmer's black angus heifer. The de-
fendant left his farm unattended for a period of twelve hours prior
to the accident. When he returned, he discovered both his heifer,
which had been killed, and the plaintiff's truck in his feedlot. The
state patrolman who investigated the accident found traces of black
hair and hide on the highway. In addition, he found scuff marks
from the dead heifer on the shoulder of the road. From these facts
the court inferred that the collision had occurred on the highway.7
The defendant admitted that he had left one gate open, and had
failed to check at least one other gate before he left. Although the
gate which had been left open enclosed an area of the farm in
which the defendant did not keep cattle, there was testimony by
a state patrolman that he had observed animal tracks leading out of
this enclosure.
The court noted that the testimony concerning the adequacy of
defendant's fences was conflicting. Nevertheless, the court ob-
served that the heifer was not confined at the time of the accident
and inferred that either the fences were inadequate, or a gate to
where the animals were enclosed was left open, or both.8 Even
though the complaint contained allegations of specific acts of negli-
gence,9 the judge sitting without a jury held the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur applicable.10 The opinion was concerned primarily
with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. However, in its first foot-
note, the court also stated that the defendant's failure to close the
gate which normally did not confine his livestock was negligence
in itself. The court reasoned that since there was potential access
to this area from either the feedlot, catch pen or pasture, the de-
fendant should have anticipated that cattle may get into this area,
and closed the gate prior to his departure."
7. Id. at 917.
8. Id. at 919.
9. The specific acts alleged were as follows:
(1) In failing to keep his heifer adequately confined or
fenced so as to prevent it from wandering upon the public
highway. (2) In failing to anticipate that such unconfined
animal could collide with a motor vehicle traveling upon the
public highway. (3) In permitting the animal to be with-
out proper care and attendance to prevent its escape from
confinement, and to wander at will in and about the pub-
lic highway, thereby endangering the property and person of
members of the public lawfully using said highway, particu-
larly the property of the plaintiff.
Id. at 916.
10. Id. at 919-20.
11. Id. at 917-18. For a collection of authorities discussing a livestock
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The defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial on
the grounds that the factual situation did not warrant the applica-
tion of res ipsa loquitur. 12 The court in a memorandum opinion 3
denied the motion and stated that the original opinion actually
"predicated liability on two independent and separate rationales' 14
-actionable negligence and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The
court in support of its application of the doctrine asserted that
pleadings in a federal district court should not be construed with
exactness and that once a case proceeds to trial, judgment should
be rendered on the evidence.15 As authority for this proposition,
the court relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b), which
provides in part:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects
as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion
of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to so
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has specifically stated that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence and not a rule of
substantive law.' 6 Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 7 this
characterization would seem to compel federal courts to apply the
federal rules to all aspects of the doctrine. Instead, since res ipsa
loquitur does have a substantial effect on the outcome of the litiga-
tion,'- federal courts in diversity actions under the authority of
owner's liability for animals that are loose on public highways, see
Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1328 (1958).
12. The defendant in addition to attacking the court's application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur also asserted that the plaintiff was not
the real party in interest.
13. Nuclear Corp. of America v. Lang, Civil No. 03681 (D. Neb. Aug. 21,
1972).
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. at 3-4.
16. Benedict v. Eppley Hotel Co., 161 Neb. 280, 283, 73 N.W.2d 228, 230,
(1955); Security Ins. Co. v. Omaha Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 Neb.
923, 925, 62 N.W.2d 127, 129 (1954).
17. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
18. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, Toars § 19.5 (1956). The authors explain
that the doctrine is a distinct advantage to the plaintiff where the is-
sue of negligence is close:
[A] very significant aspect of the doctrine has been in meet-
ing problems of proof, that is, in getting cases to the jury.
And since juries incline heavily towards plaintiffs ... the net
practical effect of the doctrine is to shift the substantive bur-
den of loss from unexplained accidents of these types from
plaintiffs to defendants.
Id. at 1081.
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Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 19 have applied state law both as to its
application 20 and effect.2 ' Stated differently, if the doctrine has
been applied in a particular jurisdiction only in certain factual sit-
uations, or has been treated as creating a presumption rather than
an inference of negligence, federal courts have followed that juris-
diction's interpretation of the doctrine.22
The court in Lang did look to Nebraska law to determine whether
the doctrine should be applied given the particular facts and cir-
cumstances. An additional, "procedural" aspect of the doctrine was
also present: the effect which pleading specific acts of negligence
has on the availability of the doctrine. Courts have adopted essen-
tially four different positions regarding the effect of pleading
specific acts of negligence: (1) the plaintiff thus waives the right
to rely on the doctrine; 23 (2) the plaintiff may rely on the doctrine
if the inference supports the specific allegations which were plead-
ed;24 (3) the doctrine is available provided the specific allegation
is accompanied by a general allegation of negligence; 25 (4) the
doctrine is available regardless of the form of pleading.2 6
The Nebraska court follows the first view, or so-called "waiver"
rule. The rule was stated in Mischnick v. Iowa-Nebraska Light
& Power Co.:2
7
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur proceeds on the theory that, under
special circumstances which invoke its operation, the plaintiff is
unable to specify the particular act of negligence which caused the
injury, but if the petition alleges particular acts of negligence, then
the plaintiff, in order to recover, must establish the specific negli-
gence alleged, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be ap-
plied.28
Adherence to the "waiver" rule in Nebraska indicates that the
court, in reality, treats the application of res ipsa loquitur as a sep-
19. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). See note 31 infra and accompanying text.
20. Simmons v. City Stores Co., 412 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1969); United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964); F.W. Martin & Co.
v. Cobb, 110 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1940); 1A J. MoORE, FEDmuL PRAcTICE
1 0.315 at 3514 (1959).
21. Skelly Oil Co. v. Holloway, 171 F.2d 670 (8th Cir. 1949); Mitchell v.
Swift & Co., 151 F.2d 770 (1st Cir. 1946); Hagan & Cushing Co. v. Wash-
ington Water Power Co., 99 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1938).
22. IA J. Mooiz, FEnnsAI P AcTicE f 0.315 at 3514 (1959).
23. Kerby v. Chicago Motor Coach Co., 28 Ill. App. 2d 259, 171 N.E.2d 412
(1960); Sankey v. Williamsen, 180 Neb. 714, 144 N.W.2d 429 (1966).
24. Vogreg v. Shephard Ambulance Co., 47 Wash. 2d 659, 289 P.2d 350
(1955).
25. Sherman v. Hartman, 137 Cal. App. 2d 589, 290 P.2d 894 (1955).
26. Johnson v. Greenfield, 210 Ark. 985, 198 S.W.2d 403 (1946); Briganti
v. Connecticut Co., 119 Conn. 316, 175 A. 679 (1934).
27. 125 Neb. 598, 251 N.W. 258 (1933).
28. Id. at 602, 251 N.W. at 259.
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arate cause of action, inconsistent with pleading and proving spe-
cific acts of negligence. If the court actually treated res ipsa as a
procedural rule of evidence, pleading it would be unnecessary.
Because of this confusion, great care must be taken by the practi-
titioner in order to insure that his "cause of action" is pleaded
correctly or the doctrine will later be unavailable. 29  Since the
"waiver rule" places the aggrieved party in a dilemma by forcing
him to make an early estimate of whether he can prove specific
acts of negligence, it has been the subject of criticism by legal com-
mentators.30
On the basis of Erie federal courts in diversity actions have, in
the past, also considered themselves bound by the applicable state
rule concerning the effect of pleading specific acts of negligence.31
The Erie doctrine, as interpreted for a time,3 2 required federal
courts to apply state law where necessary to insure that the out-
come of the litigation would be substantially the same as it would
have been had the action been tried in a state court. Using this
objective as a guideline federal courts were justified in looking to
state law to determine the effect pleading specific acts of negli-
gence should have on the availability of the doctrine.
The rule showed its first signs of erosion in Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Electric Cooperative Inc.,33 when the Supreme Court an-
nounced that "outcome" would no longer be the sole criterion. In-
stead, the Court introduced a balancing test. Federal interests and
policies were to be balanced against those of the states to deter-
mine which law to apply.3 4
In Hanna v. Plumer,3 5 the Court further clarified the judicial
effect to be given the federal rules in a diversity action. The court
29. See Lund v. Mangelson, 183 Neb. 99, 158 N.W.2d 223 (1968);
Weston v. Gold & Co., 167 Neb. 692, 94 N.W.2d 380 (1959).
30. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK or THE LAW OF ToRTs, § 40 at 233 (4th ed.
1971); Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 1 U. CHr. L. REV.
511, 528 (1934); Comment, Res Ipsa Loquitur-An Analysis of its Ap-
plication and Procedural Effects in Nebraska, 41 NEB. L. REv. 747
(1962).
31. Williamson v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 213 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.
1954); Nichols v. Barton, 201 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1953); San Diego
Gas & Electric Co. v. United States, 173 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1949); Skelly
Oil Co. v. Holloway, 171 F.2d 670 (8th Cir. 1948); Mitchell v. Swift &
Co., 151 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1945).
32. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949);
Woods v. Interstate Realty Corp., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Cohen v. Bene-
ficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
33. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
34. Id. at 540.
35. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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was faced with the question of whether service of process in a di-
versity action should be made in a manner required by state law
or as prescribed by Rule 4(d) (1). The outcome of the litigation
at that point depended entirely on which law was applied. The
Court reasoned, however, that virtually every procedural rule in
some way determines the outcome of the litigation. 6 After con-
cluding that Rule 4(d) (1) passed the requirement of the Rules
Enabling Act,37 the Court laid down the following mandate:
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the ques-
tion facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively un-
guided Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply the
Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Commit-
tee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment
that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the En-
abling Act nor constitutional restrictions.38
Under Hanna, once it has been judicially determined that a federal
rule is applicable, it is controlling as long as the rule does not vio-
late the Rules Enabling Act or the Constitution. Although no
court has specifically 39 so held, it appears that Hanna overrules
those prior decisions which had applied state law where the pro-
cedural effects of res ipsa loquitur were in issue.40
In the instant case, the court applied Rule 15(b) without any
discussion of Nebraska's "waiver" rule. Although it is impossible
to discern the court's rationale, it appears likely that the decision
to disregard the Nebraska rule was based upon the mandate of the
Hanna decision. Admittedly, there may be disagreement on
whether Nebraska's "waiver" rule is really "procedural" for choice
of law purposes.41 However, the Court in Hanna recognized that
federal power also exists to promulgate rules which govern matters
falling between the traditional categories of substance and proce-
dure.
36. Id. at 468.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
38. 380 U.S. at 471.
39. But cf. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.
1967). In this case the issue before the court was whether the appel-
lant was entitled to a directed verdict because of insufficient proof of
defectiveness. The lower court applied state law which allowed the
use of res ipsa in proving defectiveness. The court of appeals reversed
and held that the test governing the sufficiency of the evidence is a
matter of federal law and that if the application of res ipsa loquitur
contravenes the federal test, state law is not controlling. The court
concluded there was no rational basis from which the jury could in-
fer that the appellee negated the other possible causes of injury. This
decision can be distinguished because there was no federal rule in is-
sue.
40. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
41. See note 29 supra.
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[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system . . . car-
ries with it congressional power to make rules governing the prac-
tice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power
to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area
between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classi-
fication as either. 42
The obvious import of the Lang decision is to declare the
"waiver" rule a nullity when a diversity action is tried in a fed-
eral district court. The practical effect of the decision is that Ne-
braska practitioners, in diversity actions, will no longer be bound
by the strict rules of pleading required by state law in order to rely
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. A broader view of the holding
implies that if Rule 15(b) is applicable in spite of the Nebraska
rule, then other federal rules of pleading are also controlling. For
example, Rule 843 of the federal rules would allow the plaintiff
to plead both specific acts of negligence and res ipsa loquitur and
still not preclude himself from relying on the doctrine at trial.44
Whether the facts and circumstances which bring the doctrine
into play in the first place are present would still be a matter of
state law. 45 Although this seems inconsistent with the characteri-
zation of the doctrine as a rule of evidence, commentators and
courts alike have made a distinction between the factual elements
necessary to invoke res ipsa and its procedural effects once applied.
If it is merely a method of circumstantially proving negligence,
arguably it should be treated as totally procedural, the same as
any other rule of evidence. Nevertheless, since the many nuances
surrounding res ipsa have raised it to the level of a cause of action,
the factual aspect should remain a question for state law to avoid
forum shopping.
42. 380 U.S. at 472.
43. A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or
defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one count or
defense or in separate counts or defenses .... A party may
also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has re-
gardless of consistency and whether based on legal, equitable,
or maritime grounds ....
FED. R. Crv. P. 8 (e) (2).
44. See Banco Continental v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 406 F.2d 510 (5th Cir.
1969).
45. See Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 854 (5th Cir.
1967), where the court stated:
Since this state rule conflicts with the federal test, this court
will no longer rely solely on state law to determine the ap-
plicability of res ipsa loquitur ... The factors consid-
ered in deciding whether the doctrine applies are still rele-
vant; the only thing that has changed is the quantum of
proof necessary to negate the other explanations of the in-jury.
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The court's use of Rule 15(b) in Lang is consistent not only
with the Hanna decision, but also the purpose and scope of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The primary purpose of the rules
with respect to modern pleading is to allow as many claims as pos-
sible to be heard on the merits rather than unduly restricting the
plaintiff with technical rules of pleading.4 6 Where a party has
been injured and all factors point to defendant's negligence, it
seems unjust to restrict the aggrieved party because of the manner
in which the cause of action is pleaded. The federal rules provide
the flexibility necessary to avoid forcing the plaintiff to jeopardize
his right of recovery at such an early stage in the proceeding.
Although the Nebraska court has consistently adhered to the
"9waiver" rule in pleading res ipsa loquitur, the better reasoned
view of the doctrine is that it is merely a method of circumstan-
tially proving negligence and should be available to the plaintiff
regardless of the form of pleading. The Lang decision is in accord
with this analysis.
Stephen C. Johnson '74
46. See C. WRiGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDa AL Cou Ts, § 68 (2d
ed. 1970).
